Troubled Asset Relief Program: Automaker Pension Funding and Multiple
Federal Roles Pose Challenges for the FutureGAO-10-492 April 6, 2010
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Summary
Over $81 billion has been committed under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) to improve the domestic auto industry's competitiveness and
long-term viability. The bulk of this assistance has gone to General
Motors (GM) and Chrysler, who sponsor some of the largest defined benefit
pension plans insured by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC). As part of GAO's statutorily mandated oversight of TARP, this
report examines: (1) the impact of restructuring on GM's and Chrysler's
pension plans; (2) the impact of restructuring on auto supply sector
pension plans; (3) the impacts on PBGC and plan participants should auto
industry pension plans be terminated; and (4) how the federal government
is dealing with the potential tensions of its multiple roles as pension
regulator, shareholder, and creditor. To conduct this study, GAO
interviewed officials at GM, Chrysler, a labor union, a supplier
association, the Departments of the Treasury and Labor, and PBGC; and
reviewed relevant statutes, reports, and documents concerning the
automakers' restructuring and pension plan funding. Treasury and PBGC
generally agreed with the report's findings. Their technical comments and
the technical comments provided by GM, Chrysler, and Delphi, were
incorporated as appropriate.
The new GM and the new Chrysler that were established during each
company's bankruptcy process in the summer of 2009 assumed sponsorship for
all the old companies' U.S. defined benefit plans. Although the pension
plans have been maintained, their future remains uncertain. According to
current company projections, large contributions may be needed to comply
with federal pension funding requirements within the next 5 years.
Officials at the Department of the Treasury, which oversees TARP, expect
both GM and Chrysler to return to profitability. If this is the case, then
the companies will likely be able to make the required payments and
prevent their pension plans from being terminated. However, if GM and
Chrysler were not able to return to profitability and their pension plans
were terminated, PBGC would be hit hard both financially and
administratively. In early 2009, prior to the new companies assuming
sponsorship, PBGC estimated that its exposure to potential losses for GM's
and Chrysler's plans to be about $14.5 billion. Meanwhile, automaker
downsizing and the credit market crisis have created significant stress
for suppliers and their pensions. During 2009, there was a rise in the
number of supplier bankruptcies, liquidations, and pension plan
terminations. In July, the nation's largest auto parts supplier, Delphi
Corporation, terminated its pension plans with expected losses to PBGC of
over $6.2 billion. Across the auto sector as a whole, in January 2009,
PBGC estimated that unfunded pension liabilities totaled about $77
billion, with PBGC's exposure for potential losses due to unfunded
benefits of about $42 billion, leaving plan participants to bear the
potential loss of the $35 billion difference through reduced benefits.
Moreover, until Treasury either sells or liquidates the equity it acquired
in each of the companies in exchange for the TARP assistance, its role as
shareholder creates potential tensions with its role as pension regulator
and overseer of PBGC in its role as pension insurer. In particular,
tensions could arise if decisions must be made between allocating funds to
company assets (thereby protecting shareholders, including taxpayers) or
to pension fund assets (thereby protecting plan participants). As GAO
reported previously, better communication with Congress and others about
TARP interests could help mitigate such tensions.